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Abstract: Long, indecisive wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have led
some to propose a middle ground between intervening too much
and too little. One prominent strategy for this is called offshore
balancing. With ships on the water instead of boots on the ground,
power and stability would be projected at seemingly little cost or
risk. Offshore balancing, however, would be tantamount to an
unstable selective isolationism leading to a delayed and perhaps
more costly intervention.

Mearsheimer and Walt’s Offshore Balancing

P

erhaps the greatest interest to defense practitioners is the recent
proposal of the University of Chicago’s John Mearsheimer and
Harvard’s Stephen Walt for an offshore strategy.1 As realists, they
recognize not all regions reflect American national interests; many states
can be left to sort out their difficulties without our help. In a swipe at
neoconservatives, they decry the “misguided grand strategy of liberal
hegemony” that includes spreading democracy.
Instead, Mearsheimer and Walt propose a realist grand strategy
that would concentrate on “preserving U.S. dominance in the Western
Hemisphere and countering potential hegemons in Europe, Northeast
Asia, and the Persian Gulf.” They would have the United States contribute to a regional balance carried out chiefly by local powers while
American Military Power would “remain offshore as long as possible.”2
These scholars call this a strategy with a limited agenda, but it could
easily lose its limits—for example, they admit a fast-rising China “is likely
to seek hegemony” in Asia, “which the United States should undertake
a major effort to prevent.” European NATO members should take the
lead in Europe and the Russians in Syria.3 But, what happens when these
areas blow up? The devil is in the details, and the generic problem of
offshore balancing is how to control events on land from the sea.
Which shores? Mearsheimer and Walt do not mean our own
shores—something they might have considered, but would basically
amount to isolationism.4 They have no interest in the southern and
1     John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior
U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 4 (July/August 2016). See also Hal Brands and Peter
D. Feaver; John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “Should America Retrench? The Battle Over
Offshore Balancing,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 6 (November/December 2016).
2     Ibid., 71–74.
3     Ibid., 81–82.
4     See Nicholas John Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
1943).
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eastern Mediterranean basin, including Syria, where the Russians have
a small naval base at Tartus. These are areas, however, where unrest
sprouts and spreads. If the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is a
menace in Iraq, it does not cease to be a menace when it crosses into
Syria. Can local forces handle it with Iranian and Russian help? Surely,
we do not wish to see stronger Iranian and Russian roles in the region.
A victory for Iran would solidify its Shīʿiah corridor through Iraq
and Syria into Lebanon, an uncomfortable development not least for
emboldening Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese outlet, to start a new war with
Israel. Standing offshore in the Persian Gulf would not block the Shīʿah
corridor. The situation could resemble the Tonkin Gulf, where the
events of August 1964 illustrated how offshore operations easily become
stepping stones to onshore wars.
Moreover, US ships must come into port to refuel, which could
resemble the Gulf of Aden in 2000 where an al-Qaeda boat crammed
with explosives blew a big hole in the USS Cole, killing 17 American
sailors. We can, of course, refuel from supply ships, but they in turn
become the targets. The point is there is no such thing as sitting completely offshore, a land connection always requires onshore security.
Is offshore balancing inexpensive? American offshore power projection chiefly revolves around carrier strike groups, each consisting of
a carrier surrounded by escort vessels to protect it. As Lawrence Korb,
a former Navy officer who also served as assistant secretary of defense,
told the US Army War College in the early 1990s, these “floating cities”
are the most expensive way to project power, far more expensive than
land-based forces. And offshore costs are born entirely by US taxpayers;
whereas American land bases are usually subsidized by the host country,
such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea, which contribute free rent,
base construction, and maintenance. Put everything at sea, and we lose
these subsidies.
Does offshore balancing keep us out of harm’s way? The IranIraq War (1980–88) included the use of Iranian sea mines—some of
them 1908 models purchased from tsarist Russia. One mine severely
damaged a US frigate in 1988. In the Persian Gulf War (1990–91), Iraqi
mines struck two American vessels because we lacked mine-sweeping
capacity—too low-tech for us. Until European minesweepers arrived,
we improvised using US Coast Guard whaleboats with US Marine Corps
sharpshooters in the bow. At low cost, mines can block the shipping
channels of the Persian Gulf, especially in the narrow Strait of Hormuz.
China, which insists the US Navy has no business in its seas,
has shore-to-ship missiles that Beijing claims can reach hundreds of
miles. The US Navy is conducting occasional freedom-of-navigation
operations far to the south in the Spratly Islands to keep away from
mainland shores. Years ago, China provided the design of Iran’s C-802
antiship missiles, which passed some on to Hezbollah.5
The Mearsheimer-Walt article echoes Mearsheimer’s theory of
offensive realism, in which major powers construct territorial shields
to keep threats distant, an accurate description of current Russian and
5     James Holmes, “Is the U.S. Navy a Sitting Duck?” Foreign Policy, October 25, 2016.
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Chinese expansionism.6 But Mearsheimer now argues we must intrude
precisely where China does not want us to go—namely, into the South
China Sea. China may well be bluffing, but finding out is highly risky.
What about the Philippines? America’s pivot to East Asia suddenly
developed a surprising hole: the Philippines. Manila’s newly elected
President Rodrigo Duterte vows to throw America out and purchase
Chinese and Russian arms. A mercurial personality, he publicly cursed
President Obama. The Philippines depends on American support, and
we need the Philippines for an anti-China coalition; hence many suppose
Duterte’s temper tantrum will pass, but he reflects a long-simmering
Filipino nationalism that seeks freedom of maneuver.
After the Philippine Islands gained independence in 1946, major
American basing continued at Subic Bay and Clark Field until 1992, when
Manila demanded too much to renew the leases. China noted the lapse
and seized Mischief Reef in the Spratlys, claimed by the Philippines, and
fortified it. China also claims Scarborough Shoal, just 123 miles west
of Subic Bay, within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. China
muscles closer, but Duterte thinks he can get a deal: Filipino fishing
rights in exchange for friendship with China.
So, how can offshore balancing block Chinese expansionism if
there is a gap in the first island chain running from Japan through the
Philippines and Indonesia to Vietnam, which China aims to neutralize
or dominate? An international tribunal just found in favor of the
Philippines, rejecting China’s claims to the South China Sea; however,
Beijing says it will ignore this ruling. Duterte, pursuing his other goals,
has refrained from waving the ruling at Beijing, but the United States
cannot defend someone who does not want to be defended.
Another part of our Asia pivot, the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade
agreement, finalized in early 2016 after seven years of negotiations, faces
much opposition in the Senate. This rare case of Obama-Republican
cooperation collapsed as presidential contenders denounced it as
harmful to American workers. An altered and renamed partnership
could conceivably pass later; many business executives and economists
say it will boost our economy. Some strategists worry that without an
agreement China will effectively dominate the Western Pacific.7 How
would offshore balancing redress that?
How clever are we at offshore operations? The overnight detention
in early 2016 of two small US patrol craft and their crews near Iran’s
Farsi Island does not inspire confidence. They missed their rendezvous
with the refueling ship, US Coast Guard Cutter Monomoy. After covering
170 miles in four and a half hours at 38 miles per hour, the boats’
tanks must have been dry, which explains why they did not outrun the
slower Iranian boats. Squadron Commander Eric Rasch was relieved of
command, but the Navy has not told us the whole story or permitted the
detainees to speak to the media. Getting close to a hostile shore invites
6     John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, updated ed. (New York: W. W. Norton,
2014).
7     See Michael J. Green and Matthew P. Goodman, “After TPP: The Geopolitics of Asia and
the Pacific,” Washington Quarterly 38, no. 4 (Winter 2016): 19–34, dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X
.2015.1125827.

10

Parameters 46(3) Autumn 2016

snafus that easily lead to gunfire and wet-boot operations. In other
words, operations may start out offshore but are soon pulled ashore.
How do we handle China’s New Silk Roads? Little remarked, the
great geoeconomic development of our day is China’s New Silk Roads,
which are stitching Asia—and even Eurasia—together for the first time.
Railroads, pipelines, and highways in several directions are returning
China to its classic status as the Middle Kingdom (中国), the hub of
networked land corridors. Goods are already shipped by rail from
Shanghai to Spain. A rapidly growing portion of China’s energy, both oil
and natural gas, comes from central Asia and Siberia as well as through
Myanmar. The more China trades along the new routes, the less traditional sea routes will matter and the safer China’s energy supplies will be.
If an Axis-dominated Eurasia was a real and frightening prospect
in World War II, a Sino-Russian Eurasia, distant from and essentially
unreachable by American naval counterbalancing, is no less threatening.
The construction and fortification of reefs in the Spratlys yield dramatic
satellite photos, but they may be a diversion from China’s inland constructions. Again, offshore balancing would not do much to influence
this development.

Selective Isolationism, Delayed Intervention

Mearsheimer and Walt deserve praise for their critique of recent
onshore interventions and their attempt to put limits on them. Such
grand theories, however, always dissolve in the face of specific problem
areas. If applied, offshore balancing would mean selective isolationism
that easily turns into delayed intervention.
By designating just three areas for offshore balancing—Europe,
Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf—our adversaries are alerted
to the areas where we would not get involved, inviting expansionists’
opportunistic adventures. Would the two scholars include the Black Sea
in Europe, the South China Sea in Northeast Asia, and the Red Sea
with the Persian Gulf? If they do not, they offer quasi-isolationism to
keep us out of explosive areas—respectively the Ukraine, the Spratlys,
and Yemen—not a bad idea but one that requires the cooperation
of our adversaries. Mearsheimer and Walt look at much of the globe
and say: “So what?” While this perspective is a welcome corrective to
overengagement, if we say it often enough, we become isolationists.
With a grand strategy that rejects land action in the Persian Gulf’s
littoral states—or makes it rare and reluctant—what is the point of
being in the Gulf at all? To be sure, Mearsheimer and Walt have not
said “never” to land interventions but to remain offshore as long as
possible. This might please Gulf clients who prefer an “over the horizon”
US presence on ships since US bases attract resentment and bombings.
American bases on the sacred soil of Saudi Arabia were targets of Osama
bin Laden’s ire and were terminated in 2003. Riyadh and Ankara did
not permit us to launch the Iraq War (2003–11) from Saudi Arabia and
Turkey respectively: we had to launch from tiny Kuwait. Soon we may
not have a land option in the Persian Gulf.
Standing offshore in the Persian Gulf puts us in the middle of what
could soon become a regional Sunni-Shīʿah war led by Saudi Arabia and
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Iran. A US fleet cruising the Gulf could dissuade Iran, but do nothing
about dangerous Saudi economic and demographic trends. Unrest
builds over withdrawn subsidies, homegrown Sunni extremists, and an
unhappy Shīʿah minority. A succession conflict looms between Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Nayef and the king’s son, Prince Mohammad bin
Salman, who is 31 years old and in charge of just about everything. Prince
bin Salman’s ambitious reforms now rattle the kingdom. Mearsheimer
and Walt are quite right in urging us to avoid local complexities, but
Saudi instability has repercussions far beyond the peninsula.
America is already involved in an unsuccessful Saudi war in Yemen,
which uses US intelligence, aircraft, bombs, and refueling assets.
Something like a Tonkin Gulf incident is being replayed in the Red
Sea. Land-based antiship cruise missiles—of Chinese design, probably
manufactured by Iran—were deflected before they could hit the USS
Mason off Yemen’s shore, which was probably supporting Saudi bombing
of Shīʿiah Houthi rebels. The USS Nitze retaliated with cruise missiles,
destroying several onshore radar sites.8 Yemen illustrates again how offshore is intimately connected to onshore.

The Excluded-Middle Problem

Many strategic thinkers want to curtail US activity overseas, but some
seek to preserve a hegemonic role. These include ex-neoconservatives,
few of whom admit to ever having been neo-cons. Two Dartmouth professors, Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, propose a grand strategy
of “deep US engagement” abroad to counteract the “retrenchment”
mood.9 If the United States retrenched, they argue, several areas would
quickly destabilize and soon require more extensive US intervention.
America is still the sole superpower, able to stabilize the world
cheaply and with little risk. They warn against the neoconservative
temptation of overdoing engagement and the risk of escalating to major
war but do not explain how to prevent them. Like Mearsheimer and
Walt, their grand strategies are long-term and theoretical, brushing
over the devilish details, which tend to trip up theories. If you oppose
retrenchment, where precisely do you propose to defend the country’s
interests?
Mearsheimer and Walt occupy one pole of the emerging post-Iraq
strategic debate, Brooks and Wohlforth the other. The former seek
to limit engagement, the latter to maintain it. Both, however, face an
excluded-middle problem, the difficulty of holding a middle ground
between conducting massive interventions and avoiding complex
entanglements. They reject extreme solutions but may find there is no
golden mean. Events rudely shove us from cautious positions into major
interventions. Few middle grounds work over the long-term; all may be
quickly overthrown.
No strategy—offshore balancing or deep engagement—can prevent
mistaken interventions any more than the 1973 War Powers Act could.
Indeed, trying to “lock-in” any American grand strategy is a dubious
undertaking. Things change too quickly.
8     Holmes, “Navy a Sitting Duck.”
9     Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, America Abroad: The United States’ Global Role in
the 21st Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

